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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 18-2765 
________________ 
 
BARBARA GILLIS; THOMAS GILLIS; SCOTT MCCLELLAND; 
KIMBERLY A. MCCLELLAND, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF  
OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 
 
         Appellants 
  
v. 
 
RESPOND POWER, LLC 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-03856) 
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on March 14, 2019  
 
Before:  MCKEE, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 3, 2020) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Appellants in this case were subscribers to a “variable rate” service offered by 
Respond Power, LLC.  Consumers who subscribed to this service agreed to pay a 
variable rate for energy that fluctuated depending on several factors.  Appellants filed a 
proposed class action claiming that various injuries resulted from an allegedly misleading 
disclosure.  Because the District Court correctly dismissed their suit, we will affirm.  
I 
Appellants are energy consumers who entered into variable rate energy 
agreements with Respond between November 2010 and June 2014.  Under the variable 
rate energy agreement, consumers contracted with Respond for their energy instead of 
contracting directly with local utility companies.  A disclosure in the agreement stated 
that the price each consumer would pay “may vary month to month,” and that, although 
Respond’s “goal each and every month is to deliver power at a price that is less than what 
[the consumer] would have paid” the local utility company, “due to market fluctuations 
and conditions, Respond Power cannot always guarantee that every month [the 
consumer] will see savings.”1  Appellants alleged that Respond’s advertising “promised 
customers . . . that [they] would save on their monthly electric bills if they switched” to 
Respond’s service,2 and quoted from advertising that emphasized the “MAJOR 
                                              
1 App. 265. 
2 App. 441. 
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ADVANTAGES” of switching, including “Competitive Rates with Historical Average 
Savings of up to 10% Annually.”3   
Appellants filed this lawsuit after discovering that they were actually paying a 
monthly rate that was, at certain points, several times higher than the rate they would 
have paid the local utility company.  According to Appellants, neither the Disclosure nor 
Respond’s advertising adequately explained that, by switching to Respond, it was 
possible that consumers could end up paying a higher monthly rate.  They filed a putative 
class action and eventually sought certification on two Pennsylvania state law claims, one 
for breach of contract and one for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.  The District Court denied their motion for class certification.  On appeal, we 
vacated on grounds not relevant here and “remand[ed] for reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ 
motion [for class certification].”4  On remand, the District Court “recognize[d] that the 
mandate rule may require reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.”5  
Nevertheless, in the interest of efficiency and, explaining that class certification could 
depend on the merits, the court invited the company to “answer, move, or otherwise 
respond” to the complaint.6  The company moved to dismiss, and the court granted that 
motion.  The energy consumers appealed again. 
II7 
                                              
3 App. 292. 
4 Gillis, et al. v. Respond Power, 677 F. App’x 752, 753 (3d Cir. 2017).   
5 App. 465. 
6 App. 465.  
7 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1446.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 Appellants make two arguments on appeal.  First, they argue that the District 
Court failed to follow our mandate when it invited a response to the complaint instead of 
first deciding class certification.  Second, they argue that the District Court erred in 
dismissing their claims.  We review both issues de novo.8 
First, our instruction to the District Court to reconsider the motion for class 
certification did not prevent the District Court from inviting the company to respond to 
the complaint.  Appellants’ argument rests on an overly formalistic reading of our prior 
opinion.  While a district court “must implement both the letter and spirit of the 
mandate,”9 we are confident that the District Court did so here because it determined that 
the most efficient way to continue was by assessing the strength of the class’s allegations 
through motion-to-dismiss briefing.  Nor was it otherwise improper to rule on the motion 
to dismiss before reaching the question of class certification.  Class actions often proceed 
in this manner.10    
Appellants do not claim that the District Court ignored a substantive ruling from 
their prior appeal.  Indeed, we did not previously rule on the merits of Respond’s motion 
to dismiss.  “On remand, a trial court is free to ‘make any order or direction in further 
progress of the case, not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court, as to any 
                                              
8 Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018); McBride v. Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 778 F.3d 453, 458 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015). 
9 Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985).   
10 Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297, 313 n.19 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(noting that certification need not precede motion to dismiss briefing). 
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question not settled by the decision.’”11  We therefore decline Appellants’ invitation to 
intrude on the District Court’s inherent power to manage its own docket.  
Second, accepting all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing the 
complaint in the light most favorable to Appellants, we agree with the District Court that 
the complaint does not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  With respect to 
the breach of contract claim, Appellants cannot plausibly allege an ambiguity where the 
agreement at issue expressly states that “Respond Power cannot always guarantee that 
every month you will see savings.”12  Appellants fault the District Court for not applying 
Pennsylvania law on “latent” ambiguity in contracts.  Respond counters that the 
Appellants did not make this argument below.  Even assuming this argument was 
properly preserved, “the ambiguity inquiry” must pertain to the meaning of a specific 
term in the contract “rather than simply support a general claim that the parties meant 
something other than what the contract says on its face.”13   
By urging us to use the Disclosure and marketing materials to find a latent 
ambiguity in the term “Variable Rate,” and then construe that term as a prohibition on 
charging more than local utility companies, Appellants seek to do far more than interpret 
an ambiguous term.  Instead, their reading would turn the agreement on its head.  As the 
District Court said, the disclosure contains “clear and unambiguous language” that 
                                              
11 Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 950 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
12 App. 237.   
13 Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
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vitiates Appellants’ claims,14 and a court “may not modify the plain meaning under the 
guise of interpretation.”15 16  
Appellants’ second remaining cause of action is for breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing.  Pennsylvania appellate courts, as well as federal courts sitting in 
diversity, have generally held that every contract under Pennsylvania law imposes a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of the contract.17  
Appellants argue that Respond violated this duty by charging more than local utility 
companies for energy.  The District Court correctly dismissed this claim, as the implied 
duty does not displace the clear terms of the parties’ written agreement.18  As discussed 
above, that agreement imposed no obligation on Respond to charge less than local utility 
                                              
14 App. 17. 
15 Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating & Cooling LLC, 100 A.3d 660, 665 (Pa. Super. 
2014). 
16 In a similar case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Mirkin v. XOOM Energy, 
LLC, 931 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2019), energy consumers sued the third-party energy supplier 
for breach of contract.  The variable rate contract there provided that the monthly rate 
would be based on XOOM’s “actual and estimated supply costs.”  Because the 
consumers’ rates were far higher than those costs, the court held that the consumers’ 
allegations were sufficient to state a claim.  The present case is distinguishable from 
XOOM because Respond’s contract lists different factors as the basis for cost and the 
consumers do not argue that Respond failed to base its rate on those factors. 
17 E.g., J.J. DeLuca Co. v. Toll Naval Assocs., 56 A.3d 402, 412 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(stating that every contract imposes such a duty); Kamco Indus. Sales, Inc. v. Lovejoy, 
Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 416, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (assuming the duty exists); but see Ash v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 523, 533 n.2 (2007) (declining to decide the issue).   
18 See, e.g., USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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companies every month.  The agreement only required that Respond base its variable rate 
on certain factors.  Appellants do not argue that Respond failed to do so.19 
III 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
granting Respond’s motion to dismiss. 
                                              
19 Furthermore, Appellants’ reliance on Kamco Industrial Sales, Inc. is misplaced, as that 
case involved the interpretation of an ambiguous contract provision that would have 
nullified other provisions in the contract, see 779 F. Supp. 2d at 427-29. 
